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Unforeseen circumstances sometimes disturb states’ daily-life and expose them to 
situations of emergency to which authorities must then expeditiously respond.  
These situations can be due to several factors. One can under more think of 
emergencies caused by  
- natural factors – for example, when climate is so arid that significant risks of 
drought arise –,  
- security concerns – one can think of terrorist threat –, or by  
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- economic reasons – for example, when a serious epidemic is ravaging animal 
farms and crippling trade.  
Some of these risks are foreseeable while others are unforeseeable. 
In order to deal with these changes and to react as quickly as possible, States often 
set up specific legislative procedures which derogate from the usual ones. One main 
difficulty is to determine the best way to react: by adopting preventive measures? By 
accelerating the legislative procedure? By giving competence to new authorities, 
specifically in charge of managing emergency situations?  
In that respect, it’s not uncommon that in these circumstances the distribution of 
powers between the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary, as it is enacted in 
the Constitution or in other legal texts, is temporarily altered. Some states have put 
in place a proper “state of exception”, that is a situation in which a country, when 
confronted with a severe and imminent threat, responds by taking actions that would 
not be acceptable under normal circumstances, given the constitutional principles of 
that country. This definition is broad enough to cover situations of emergency caused 
by the three different factors we have mentioned above.  
Our presentation seeks to give an overview of how situations of emergency are dealt 
with in Belgium. 
Then, we would be happy to discuss with all members of the panel what are the 
similarities and the differences between your respective countries and Belgium.  
 
II. Absence of a constitutional opportunity to suspend Constitution 
In most European countries, recent situations of emergency have been the 
consequence of the wave of terrorist attacks that affected them. For example, we 
think of: 
- the attacks in Paris, at the headquarters of the Charlie Hebdo magazine’s (7 
January 2015), and simultaneously at the national football stadium and inside the 
Bataclan music venue (13 November 2015); 
- the attack in Berlin perpetrated with a truck that went into the crowd at a Christmas 
market (19 December 2016); 
- the attack in London, in front of Westminster Parliament (22 March 2017). 
Belgium did not escape this terrorist wave and faced, under more, a terrorist attack 
at the Jewish museum in Brussels (24 May 2014), and another one simultaneously 
at Brussels airport and inside the Brussels metro (22 March 2016). Especially the 
last two attacks, which caused more than 30 casualties, underlined Belgium’s patent 
difficulties in providing a quick response when faced with obvious, current, and 
imminent danger.  
Indeed, Belgium’s constitution – which dates from 1831 and which is, alongside 
those of the US and Norway, one of oldest constitutional documents still in force – 
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does not explicitly enshrine a specific provision concerning situations of emergency. 
Quite the contrary: its article 187 explicitly forbids a scenario in which the 
Constitution is suspended “in part or in the whole”. This prohibition of suspension of 
one or several of its articles – which dates from 1831 – can be explained by historical 
reasons, specific to the 19th century: the Dutch King William of the Netherlands had 
suspended some provisions of the Dutch Constitution, and the French King Charles 
X had also enacted several unconstitutional bye-laws, which had in France to the 
revolution of July 18301.  
These historic experiences convinced the Belgian constitutional assembly (the 
National Congress) that any possibility of suspension of the new Constitution which 
was about to be adopted could leave open the possibility of abuse2. This is why an 
article was included (article 130; current Article 187) which, since then, is written as 
follows: “‘[t]he Constitution cannot be wholly or partially suspended’. Thus, it forbids 
in plain and intelligible language all emergency situations. It is a strict illustration of 
the Delegatus non potest delegare principle3:  under any circumstances, the 
Constitution must be strictly applied and respected. This Article has never been 
amended since, despite the fact that the Constitution has been subject to very far-
going changes on other points. 
 
III. In practice: need to circumvent Article 187 and to find a way out 
Belgium however did face emergency situations in which it was absolutely essential 
to react quickly by adopting legislations : authorities had thus to find solutions to 
circumvent Article 187 and the traditional legislative procedures provided by Articles 
74 and following of the Constitution. 
One of the first time authorities faced such an emergency situation was during the 
First World War. Parliament was materially unable to gather and it was also 
impossible to organize new elections. Consequently, the solution was found – 
although no provision of the Constitution says so – to allow the King to pass 
statutory orders in time of war (“Decree-law”, “Arrêté-loi”) in order to defend 
interests of the country. After the war, the Belgian Supreme court (“Cour de 
cassation”) recognized the constitutionality of these decrees-laws, arguing that the 
intent of the 1831 constitutional assembly had certainly been to ensure the continuity 
of the State (judgment of 11 February 1919, Geubelle). 
																																																						
1 JAN VELAERS, SEBASTIEN VAN DROOGHENBROECK, “L’article 187 de la Constitution et la problématique de la 
protection des droits et libertés dans les Etats d’exception”, in EMMANUEL VANDENBOSSCHE (ed), Uitzonderlijke 
omstandigheden in het grondwettelijk recht, Brugge, die Keure, 2019, p. 6. 
 PAUL ERRERA, Traité de droit public belge, Paris, Giard & Brière, 1918, p. 18. 
2 CHARLES HUBERLANT, État de siège et légalité d’exception en Belgique, in: Licéité en droit positif et 
références légales aux valeurs. Contribution à l’étude juridique du règlement des conflits de valeurs en droit 
pénal, public et international, Brussels, Bruylant, 1982, at 401. 
3	This principle has been mainly popularized by the jugde Coke in England (E. COKE, Institutes of the Laws of 
England : second part, Londres, E. and R. Brooke, 1797, p. 597), who has taken it from work of Roman law 
commentators (P.W. DUFF et H.E. WHITESIDE, « Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari A Maxim of 
American Constitutional Law », Cornell Law Review, vol. 14, 1929, p. 171). 
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These decrees-laws had the same normative value as a statute passed in 
Parliament (cfr. Cass., 11 February 1919, and ; Cass., 11 December 1944, Leemans) 
and thus the Constitutional Court is competent to review their constitutionality 
(judgment nr. 115/99, 10 November 1999).  
What however when the country is not at war, when it is not occupied by foreign 
troops? Could the King pass statutory orders in situations of insecurity or react after 
a terrorist attack? The answer to this question seems to be negative4. The public 
institutions must thus in all circumstances enact legislation according to the regular 
parliamentary procedures ; and the exercise of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms can only be limited by a statute adopted pursuant to these procedures.  
New procedures of emergency could only be implemented by following the 
constitutional amendment procedure laid down in article 195 of the Constitution, 
which is particularly cumbersome. 
This does however not mean that no solution whatsoever is available. Indeed, 
parliament can use the procedure of article 105, provision which makes it possible to 
enact ‘special power laws’, by which specific powers are delegated to the 
executive5. Theses powers can include the ability to amend, to repeal or to replace 
statutory provisions. The use of these “special powers” allows thus the King to adopt 
measures that could normally only be taken by Parliament itself, pursuant to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.  
That being said, this ‘special powers’ mechanism has never been used in the field of 
national security or of natural catastrophes; its use has so far been limited to 
economic, budgetary and financial questions, and to reforms in the areas of social 
security and labour law; also, article 105 does not exonerate executive power from 
its obligation to respect the fundamental rights.  
 
Given all these elements, it has been considered to amend article 187 of the 
Constitution. This was considered on three occasions …but never materialized. Also, 
amendment does not seem politically likely in the near future.  
 
IV. What about other parts of the World? Discussion 
The Belgian Constitution is more protective than international conventions6, which 
provide, in a controlled manner, derogation provisions, particularly Article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The two articles are similar, as both allow State 
																																																						
4 NICOLAS BONBLED, « Les aspects contemporains de la continuité de l’État: l’exception, l’urgence et la 
transition », Journal des Tribunaux, 2014, at 643. 
5 Cass., 3 mai 1974, Le Compte, Pas., I, p. 910.	
6 NICOLAS BONBLED AND CELINE ROMAINVILLE, « États d’exceptions et crises humaines ambigües: débat recent 
autour du terrorisme et des nouvelles forms de crise », in : Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle, 
2008, at 429. 
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Parties to ‘take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.7 Both 
conventions provide a list of rights from which no derogations are possible, even in 
cases of emergency. 
Thus, international human rights law allows countries to enact constitutional and/or 
statutory provisions that set out and provide for a legal “state of emergency”, and the 
latter can even entail the – temporary – reduction of individual rights. One of the 
most prominent examples is article 16 of the French Constitution, which allows for a 
delegation of legislative powers to the President in exceptional circumstances.  
We would be delighted to take advantage of this panel in order to discuss how these 





7 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 19 February 2009, A. e.a v. the United Kingdom case.  
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